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Abstract
This paper analyzes the eﬃcient taxation of oil and capital income
in an oil-dependent infinite-lived economy facing perfect capital mobil-
ity. Two cases are examined: one with product market imperfections
and free tax choice, one with perfect competition and tax restrictions.
The optimal tax rates on oil and capital strictly depend on the inter-
national tax system implemented; however, they are also aﬀected by
the degree of market power and the extent to which monopoly profits
are taxed, the type of tax restrictions and the use of oil (as an input or
a consumer good). Under the residence-based system, capital income
should always be exempted from taxation, while the optimal tax on
productive oil may diﬀer from zero. Under the source-based system,
second-best taxes on capital and oil are non-zero.
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1 Introduction
It is amply recognized that the non-environmental eﬃciency costs associated
with taxation of oil (energy, in general) used as a factor of production are very
large. This is because taxes on productive oil distort, directly or indirectly,
three margins: the labor-leisure margin, the intertemporal margin and the
intermediate-good choice margin.1 The non-environmental eﬃciency losses
of taxes imposed on oil used by households as a consumer good are, instead,
much smaller, as they only aﬀect the labor-leisure and the consumer-good
choice margins. See, for example, Goulder (1994) and Newbury (2005) for
thorough discussions of the consequences of the two types of oil taxation on
the resource allocation.
As distortions are minimized by those taxes that only aﬀect the intratem-
poral margins,2 the previous considerations have immediate normative im-
plications in a world with no environmental externalities: The optimal tax
rate on productive oil should be zero, while the tax rate on household con-
sumption of oil should be positive.
The elegant doctrinary support of such tax prescriptions is oﬀered by
the Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) principle of public finance: Production
eﬃciency requires that taxes are to be levied only on final goods (oil used
for consumption) as intermediate goods (oil used for production) should be
exempted from taxation, when the product market is perfectly competitive
and the technology is constant-returns-to-scale.3
The optimality of the zero tax rate on productive oil is invalidated when
there are externalities associated with the use of oil or restrictions on the
choice of tax instruments. See, among the others, Goulder (1994), Boven-
berg and Goulder (2002), and De Miguel and Manzano (2005). By studying
1These margins regard the labor market, the capital market and the intermediate-good
market, respectively.
2See Diamond and McFadden (1974).
3Under such circumstances, the optimal tax rate on oil used for consumption should be
equal to the other consumption good tax rates as prescribed by the Atkinson and Stiglitz
(1972) principle of uniform taxation of consumption goods. This principle — a corollary of
the intermediate-goods result — is satisfied when preferences are homothetic and weakly
separable in consumption goods and leisure.
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the second-best taxation of oil in a perfectly competitive small open economy
that imports oil and faces perfect capital mobility, De Miguel and Manzano
(2005) show, for example, that the zero-tax result for productive oil is vi-
olated when a uniform taxation of oil employed by firms and oil used by
households is imposed, and a consumption tax is the only additional source
of government revenue. If also labor, in addition to consumption, were taxed
at an optimal rate, the uniform oil taxation would become zero as the com-
petitive equilibrium from incomplete (that is, when there are more equations
than independent tax instruments) becomes complete.4
There are strong analogies between a tax on oil used for production and
a capital income tax. By aﬀecting the intertemporal margin, a tax on capi-
tal income is highly distortionary too. As capital represents an intermediate
good (since it does not enter the utility function), the Diamond and Mirrlees
(1971) prescription also applies to capital taxation: Capital income, like
productive oil, should be exempted from taxation from a second-best per-
spective. This result, discovered by Chamley (1986) for a closed economy,
holds asymptotically.5
The Chamley (1986) tax rule is also valid for an open economy financially
integrated with the rest of the world; see, for example, Correia (1996a),
Atkeson, Chari and Kehoe (1999), and Chari and Kehoe (1999). This open
economy result does not depend on the type of international capital tax
system implemented.
The zero capital tax rule is based on the hypotheses of perfect competition
in the product market and no limitations on the choice of tax instruments.
The removal of one of such supporting assumptions implies that the optimal
capital tax rate diﬀers from zero since the Diamond and Mirrlees (1971)
principle is invalidated.6 This is shown, for example, by Jones, Manuelli
and Rossi (1993, 1997), Correia (1996b), Guo and Lansing (1999) and Judd
4See Chari and Kehoe (1999).
5The optimal capital tax rate may diﬀer from zero outside the steady state. If however
a CRRA utility function is assumed, it is optimal to tax capital income only in the initial
period (Chamley, 1986).
6Stiglitz and Dasgupta (1971), and Munk (1980) analyze the consequences of these
hypotheses on optimal commodity taxation.
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(2002).7
In the literature of dynamic public economics developed so far, the impli-
cations of firms with market power or a tax code that is not suﬃciently rich
have been unexplored in the analysis of the joint normative taxation of oil
and capital. As the eﬀects of these assumptions for the second-best factor
tax results are quite complicated to figure out on a simple intuitive basis, the
aim of this paper is to study them theoretically within an oil-importing open
economy peopled by immortal agents. The implications of imperfections in
the product market and limitations on tax setting are analyzed separately.
Issues related to the environmental dimension of oil and therefore to the
externality correcting role of factor taxation are not addressed in this paper.
Particular attention is devoted to the analysis of the international regime
of capital income taxation. Two international systems of capital taxation
are considered: the residence-based (also called worldwide) system and the
source-based (often denominated territorial) system. The residence-based
principle prescribes that taxation is levied on capital income of domestic
residents regardless of the country where income is originated. Source-based
capital income taxes are, instead, imposed on all capital income obtained in
a particular jurisdiction regardless of the residence country of savers.
The optimal analysis developed here assumes that the government has
access to a commitment technology. This hypothesis guarantees the sustain-
ability of second-best plans by eliminating problems of time inconsistency.
We depart substantially from the results obtained with perfect competi-
tion and free tax choice. In fact, in the cases studied — one with monopolistic
competition and no limitations on the tax choice, and one with perfect com-
petition and tax restrictions — we discover that the optimal taxation of oil
and capital income strictly depend on the international tax system imple-
mented; in addition, it depends on the degree of market power, the extent
7Also the consideration of a technology that exhibits constant-returns-to-scale with
respect to all the inputs is at the base of the Chamley (1986) result. When a production
function having constant-returns-to-scale with respect to the reproducible inputs alone is,
instead, considered, the zero capital tax result is no longer valid; see Jones, Manuelli and
Rossi (1993), and Judd (1999). Such a case can be seen as a combination of the hypotheses
of product market imperfections (because of pure profits) and tax restrictions (because of
the absence of monopoly power distortions).
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to which monopoly profits are taxed, the type of tax restrictions and the
diﬀerent uses of oil (whether for production or consumption).
We begin by studying the role of product market imperfections.8 We find
that the capital income tax is zero when a system of residence-based taxation
is adopted. Tariﬀs on oil used as an input should be zero too if monopoly
profits are tax free. If, instead, firm profits were fiscally confiscated, oil should
be subsidized. Therefore, government spending is solely (or mainly, when
profits are taxed at the 100% rate) financed through labor taxation. Because
of perfect capital mobility, it is the taxation of foreign assets, constrained to
be equal to that of domestic capital, that is driving to zero capital income
and, in the case of untaxed profits, oil taxes.
Under the source-based system of taxation, the optimal factor tax struc-
ture is more articulated.9 Capital and oil should be both subsidized (but
at diﬀerent rates) when monopoly profits are either tax free or taxed at the
100% rate. In both cases, capital should be subsidized more than oil. If
profits are instead taxed as capital income, the capital tax rate could be pos-
itive, while the oil tax rate should be unambiguously negative provided that
capital and oil are Edgeworth complementary.
Furthermore, we analyze the role of tax restrictions on the optimal fac-
tor tax structure in models with perfect competition.10 Two sub-cases are
investigated: one in which the tax burden only falls on capital and oil since
labor cannot be taxed, one in which the tax rates on oil used for production
and oil used for consumption are constrained to be the same.
When labor is untaxed, productive oil should bear the burden of taxation
under the worldwide system as the optimal capital tax rate is zero. In the
territorial system, instead, the second-best tax load should be distributed
8Guo and Lansing (1999), and Judd (2002) show that the consideration of firms with
market power leads to the invalidity of the Chamley (1986) prescription on capital taxation
in a closed economy. In a setup that incorporates imperfect competition, the eﬃciency
costs of oil taxes are exacerbated; this is shown by Rotemberg and Woodford (1994), who
however do not investigate Ramsey taxation of oil.
9Note that the findings obtained under the territorial tax regime correspond to those
that would be registered with financial autarky.
10The implications of the richness of the tax code for the second-best taxation of capital
are studied by Jones, Manuelli and Rossi (1993, 1997), and Correia (1996b).
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over oil and capital.
In the case of uniform taxation of oil used by firms and households, op-
timality prescribes that oil and labor should be jointly taxed. Under the
residence-based system, capital income should be entirely lifted from taxa-
tion, while, under the source-based system, capital income should be subsi-
dized.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 develops an
imperfectly competitive model of an oil-importing small open economy and
studies the normative properties of factor taxation. Section 3 examines the
implications of tax restrictions on the optimal tax structure under perfect
competition. Section 4 summarizes the results and concludes.
2 An imperfectly competitive economy with
free tax choices
2.1 The model
Consider a small open economy that imports oil from the rest of the world
and operates in a globalized financial market. The world interest rate and
the international oil price are given. This economy, populated by monopo-
listic firms, produces a single tradable good, perfectly substitutable with the
foreign produced good. Without implicating the generality of the results, we
assume that oil is only used for production.11
Product market imperfections are incorporated into the analysis by using
the Benhabib and Farmer (1994) supply-side apparatus. There are two sec-
tors in the economy: a final good sector, which is perfectly competitive, and
an intermediate good sector, which is monopolistically competitive. The per-
fectly competitive sector produces a unique final good by using diﬀerentiated
intermediate goods. The imperfectly competitive sector, instead, produces
intermediate goods by using physical capital, labor and oil.
11It is not diﬃcult to show that the consideration of household oil consumption would
not aﬀect our normative findings for capital and productive oil taxation; it would only
additionally imply a positive tax rate on oil used by consumers.
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The final good y is produced through the linearly homogeneous produc-
tion function
y =
?? 1
0
y1−µi di
? 1
1−µ
, (1)
where yi represents the ith intermediate good, and i is continuous in the in-
terval [0,1]; µ " [0, 1) is the reciprocal of the elasticity of substitution among
intermediate inputs. Final good producing firms maximize profits by choos-
ing the optimal quantity of each intermediate good. Profit maximization
yields the following input demand
yi
y
= pi
− 1
µ , (2)
where pi is the price of the ith intermediate good and the price of the final
good, taken to be the numeraire, has been normalized to one. Since the final
sector is perfectly competitive, firms’ profits should be zero. This requires
that
? 1
0
p
µ−1
µ
i di = 1.
The technology used in the intermediate goods sector is given by
yi = F (ki, li, ei), (3)
where ki, li and ei represent capital, labor and oil used for producing inter-
mediate good ith, respectively. F ( · ) satisfies the neoclassical properties of
regularity and is constant-returns-to-scale. In the absence of clear empirical
evidence, we assume — as in Svensson (1984), and Rotenberg and Woodford
(1994, 1996)— that all factors of production are Edgeworth complementary;
that is, the three cross-partial derivatives of F ( · ) are positive.
After using (2) for pi, the ith firm’s profit in the intermediate sector
(measured in terms of the final good) can be expressed as Πi = yµy
1−µ
i −
Rki−wli− (1+ τ e)p∗eei, where R is the real rental price of capital, w the real
wage, p∗e the international price of oil (expressed in terms of domestic output)
and τ e the ad valorem tariﬀ/tax rate on imported oil. The ith intermediate
good producer maximizes Πi by taking into account the production function
(3). The first-order conditions for maximum profits are
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(1− µ)
?
y
yi
?µ
Fki(ki, li, ei) = R, (4a)
(1− µ)
?
y
yi
?µ
Fli(ki, li, ei) = w, (4b)
(1− µ)
?
y
yi
?µ
Fei(ki, li, ei) = (1 + τ e)p
∗
e. (4c)
We consider a situation of symmetric equilibrium in which ki = k, li = l,
ei = e, yi = y and pi = 1. In this situation, the input demands become
(1− µ)Fk(k, l, e) = R, (4a’)
(1− µ)Fl(k, l, e) = w, (4b’)
(1− µ)Fe(k, l, e) = (1 + τ e)p∗e. (4c’)
Profits in the intermediate good sector are positive and equal to Π =
µF (k, l, e). µ measures the degree of market power in the economy; µ =
0 describes a perfectly competitive intermediate-good sector and hence an
economy with no product market imperfections.
Consumers are identical and in a fixed number. The representative con-
sumer maximizes the following intertemporal utility function
? ∞
0
U(c, x)e−ρtdt, (5)
where c is consumption, x leisure and ρ the fixed rate of time preference.
The instantaneous utility function U( · ) is strictly increasing and concave in
its arguments. Consumption and leisure are normal goods. Leisure is given
by the fixed time endowment, normalized to one, less hours worked; that is,
x = 1− l.
Consumers accumulate financial wealth, a, by holding capital, foreign
assets, b, and government bonds, d; that is, a = k + b+ d.
The consumer budget constraint should be specified according to the
international tax regime implemented. In an open economy, two regimes of
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capital taxation can be considered: the worldwide or residence-based system
and the territorial or source-based system. Under the residence-based system
of international taxation, incomes from domestic and foreign wealth are taxed
equally. Therefore, the household flow budget constraint is given by
c+
.
k +
.
b +
.
d= (1− τk)[(R− δ)k+ r∗b]+ rd+(1− τ l)wl+(1−ωτk)ψΠ, (6)
where τk represents a proportional worldwide capital tax rate, δ the capital
depreciation rate, r∗ the world interest rate, r the real return on government
debt, τ l the ad valorem labor tax rate, and ω and ψ are non-negative pa-
rameters that capture (by taking alternatively values 0 and 1) diﬀerent tax
treatments of monopoly profits.
Dividends enter (6) as consumers are the owners of firms. As pure profits
only exert income eﬀects, their separate taxation would prescribe the confis-
catory 100% rate from a normative standpoint. Since tax authorithies may
be unable to distinguish capital income from dividends or consumers may
evade taxes by concealing profits to the fiscal administration, such an opti-
mal taxation of profits is diﬃcult to implement in practise. Therefore, we
consider the following three alternative cases of profit taxation:12
i) confiscatory taxation of pure profits; that is, ψ = 0;
ii) tax free monopoly profits; that is, ω = 0 and ψ = 1;
iii) pure profits that are taxed at the same rate as income from capital; that
is, ω = ψ = 1.
The maximization of (5) subject to (6) yields the following first-order
conditions
Uc = ξ, (7a)
Ux
ξ
= (1− τ l)w, (7b)
ρ−
.
ξ
ξ
= (1− τk)r∗, (7c)
12Identical hypotheses are considered by Guo and Lansing (1999), who in addition pos-
tulate diﬀerent fiscal treatments of depreciation allowances.
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R− δ = r∗ = r/(1− τk), (7d)
together with the proper transversality conditions on k, b and d. ξ, the
Lagrange multiplier on the flow budget constraint (6), represents the shadow
value of financial wealth.
Equations (7) are fairly standard. Perfect capital mobility along with the
residence tax system implies that the before-tax rates of return on domestic
and foreign assets are equalized; this is contemplated by (7d).
Consider the source-based regime of taxation. In this case, income from
capital is taxed at a proportional rate τk, while income from foreign assets
is untaxed. The consumer instantaneous budget constraint is
c+
.
k +
.
b +
.
d= (1− τk)(R− δ)k+ r∗b+ rd+(1− τ l)wl+(1−ωτk)ψΠ. (6’)
Also in this case, the diﬀerent regimes of profit taxation, described above,
are captured by assigning diﬀerent values to ω and ψ.
Now the representative consumer maximizes (5) subject to (6’). The first-
order conditions for this problem are given by (7a), (7b) and the following
relationships
ρ−
.
ξ
ξ
= r∗, (7c’)
(1− τk)(R− δ) = r∗ = r. (7d’)
Under the source-based regime, the after-tax rate of return on capital is
equal to the world interest rate, from (7d’).
The government budget deficit is financed by issuing government debt. In
the case of the worldwide regime, the government budget constraint is given
by
.
d +τk[r
∗(k + b) + ωψΠ] + τ lwl + τ ep
∗
ee+ (1− ψ)Π = rd+ g, (8)
where g is unproductive government spending.
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When the territorial principle of capital income taxation is considered,
the government budget constraint becomes
.
d +τk[(R− δ)k + ωψΠ] + τ lwl + τ ep∗ee+ (1− ψ)Π = rd+ g. (8’)
In the Ramsey policy experiments developed below, we will assume that the
government follows a budget balanced policy — i.e., the stock of government
debt is constant — and g is exogenously given.
The excess of national income over aggregate demand and oil imports
gives the rate of accumulation of foreign assets; that is,
.
b= y + r
∗b− c−
.
k −δk − g − p∗ee. (9)
This is the feasibility constraint of our small open economy.
2.2 Second-best optimal policy
The residence-based system
The eﬃcient tax structure is determined by solving the ’Ramsey problem’,
which prescribes to maximize the utility of the representative consumer once
the competitive equilibrium with distortionary taxes and the constraint that
a given amount of revenue has to be raised are taken into account.
We employ the ’primal approach’ to optimal taxation developed by Lucas
and Stokey (1983), which combines the consumer intertemporal budget con-
straint with the optimal conditions of utility maximization.13 This method
is based on the implementability constraint, which summarizes such a com-
bination.
The implementability constraint in the case of the worldwide system of
taxation is obtained as follows. Plugging (7d) into the flow budget constraint
(6) and integrating forward (after the transversality conditions are incorpo-
rated), the intertemporal budget constraint is obtained
13A paradigmatic application of the ’primal method’ in a continuous-time setup is pro-
vided by Lucas (1990).
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? ∞
0
[c− (1− τ l)wl − (1− ωτk)ψΠ]e−
? t
0 (1−τk)(R−δ)dudt = a0, (10)
where a0 is nonhuman wealth a time 0. From (7c) and (7d), the shadow value
of wealth can be expressed as ξ = ξ0e
ρt−
? t
0 (1−τk)(R−δ)du, where ξ0 = Uc(c0, x0).
Plugging (7b) into (10) and using the previous expression for ξ as well as the
time allocation constraint, the implementability constraint is derived; that
is,
? ∞
0
{cξ − Ux(1− x)− (1− ωτk)ψξΠ}e−ρtdt = ξ0a0. (11)
Because of the diﬀerent tax treatments of profits, the Ramsey problem
has to be devised in such a way as to consider the possibility that income
from wealth and profits are taxed at the same rate. Therefore, the eﬃcient
second-best tax structure is found by maximizing the utility functional (5)
subject to the implementability constraint (11) — with Π = µF (k, 1−x, e) —,
the feasibility constraint (9) — with F (k, 1 − x, e) that replaces y — and the
Euler equation (7c), once the the static eﬃciency condition (7a) is taken into
account.14
The conceptual characterization of the eﬃcient tax structure is
Proposition 1 In a monopolistically competitive oil-dependent economy fac-
ing perfect capital mobility, in which the residence-based tax system is applied,
optimality calls for a zero capital tax rate. Oil taxation should be zero too
when monopoly profits are untaxed. If instead dividends are taxed at the
100% rate, oil should be subsidized. Regardless of the profit tax treatment,
labor cannot be exempted from the burden of taxation.
Proof. The Hamiltonian for the Ramsey problem is
H =W (c, x, e, k, ξ, τk) + Γ [F (k, 1− x, e) + r∗b− c− δk − g − p∗ee] +
+Ωξ[ρ− (1− τk)r∗] +∆(ξ − Uc),
14The additional constraints (7c) and (7a) are to be considered in the Ramsey problem
since τk enters the implementability constraint when pure profits are taxed as capital
income (that is, ω = ψ = 1).
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where W ( · ) is the pseudo-welfare function of the planner, given by
W (c, x, e, k, ξ, τk) = U(c, x)+Φ[cξ−Ux(1−x)− (1−ωτk)ψξµF (k, 1−x, e)],
and Γ, Ω, ∆ and Φ are the Lagrange multipliers associated with (9), (7c),
(7a) and (11), respectively.
The first-order conditions of the second-best problem are
Wc = Γ+∆Ucc, (12a)
Wx = ΓFl +∆Ucx, (12b)
−Φ(1− ωτk)ψξµFe + Γ(Fe − p∗e) = 0, (12c)
−
.
Γ +Γρ = −Φ(1− ωτk)ψξµFk + Γ(Fk − δ), (12d)
−
.
Γ +Γρ = Γr
∗, (12e)
−
.
Ω +ρΩ = Φ[c− (1− ωτk)ψµF ] + Ω[ρ− (1− τk)r∗] +∆, (12f)
Ω = −ωψΦµF
r∗
, (12g)
where Wc ≡ Uc[1 + Φ(1 + ηc)] and Wx ≡ Ux[1 + Φ(1 + ηx)].15
In a steady state equilibrium, the Ramsey plan requires, from (12e), that
r∗ = ρ. When this relationship is contrasted with (7c), we get
∼
τ k= 0.16
After using (4a’), (7c) and (7d) into the long-run version of (12d) and
taking into account
∼
τ k= 0, we obtain that Γ = ξΦ when profits are not taxed
(that is, ψ = 1). Once this condition is used into (12c) together with (4c’),
we obtain
∼
τ e= 0.
15ηc and ηx represent general equilibrium elasticities. They are given by the expressions:
ηc = −(1− x)
Uxc
Uc
and ηx = −(1− x)
Uxx
Ux
+
(1− ωτk)ψUcµFl
Ux
.
16Tax rates with tilde denote the second-best eﬃcient tax rates.
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If, instead, profits are taxed at a confiscatory rate — i.e., ψ = 0 — the
condition (12c), combined with (4c’) and
∼
τ k= 0, implies that
∼
τ e= −µ.
The eﬃcient labor income tax rate is unambiguously positive.17 ?
Product market imperfections do not alter the prescription of a zero cap-
ital tax under the worldwide system, obtained in a competitive setup by
Correia (1996a). This is because the tax rates of domestic capital and net
claims on foreigners are constrained to be the same and net foreign assets do
not appear in the pseudo-welfare function of the social planner. Therefore,
the assumption of perfect capital mobility is driving the zero capital result
as profits entering the intertemporal budget constraint of consumers play no
role for the optimal capital tax structure.
Our results on capital taxation are, however, surprising, as they diﬀer
substantially from the closed economy ones. In a monopolistically compet-
itive closed economy, capital subsidization is necessary from a normative
standpoint to cure the distortionary eﬀects of firm market power.18
The regime of profit taxation, which is inconsequential for capital taxa-
tion, aﬀects oil taxation. If profits are confiscatorily taxed, oil used by firms
must be subsidizied; otherwise, oil for production, like capital, should be tax
free.
The source-based system
In the case of the territorial system of capital taxation, as the after-tax
return on capital is equal to the world interest rate, the consumer intertem-
poral budget —obtained from (6’) and (7d’)— is given by (10).
By substituting the static eﬃciency condition (7b) into (10) (in order
to express prices and taxes in terms of quantities) and using the expression
ξ = ξ0e
ρt−
? t
0 (1−τk)(R−δ)du — derived from (7c’) and (7d’) — we get the imple-
mentability constraint, which corresponds to (11).
Now the second-best problem is
17Obviously, when the taxation of profits is confiscatory, the tax burden on labor is
partly lifted.
18See, for example, Judd (2002). Guo and Lansing (1999) obtain diﬀerent results with
imperfect competition because of the diversified tax treatment of depreciation allowances
and monopoly profits.
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max
? ∞
0
W (c, x, e, k, τk)e−ρtdt (13a)
subject to
.
k +
.
b= F (k, 1− x, e) + r∗b− c−
.
k −δk − g − p∗ee, (13b)
and
(1− τk)[(1− µ)Fk − δ] = r∗, (13c)
where
W (c, x, e, k, τk) = U(c, x)+Φ[cUc−Ux(1−x)− (1−ωτk)ψUcµF (k, 1−x, e)],
and Φ > 0 is the multiplier on equation (11). The constraint (13c), imposed
on the Ramsey problem, is necessary for realizing the possibility that capital
income and pure profits can be taxed at the same rate.
In this case, we can state that
Proposition 2 When the source-based system of capital taxation is imple-
mented in an oil-dependent small open economy with monopolistic competi-
tion, the optimal structure of factor taxation strictly depends on the extent to
which pure profits are taxed. The optimal tariﬀ on oil used for production and
tax on capital are negative when monopoly profits are either untaxed or taxed
confiscatorily. When profits are taxed at the same rate as capital income, the
capital tax rate is ambiguous, while the tax rate on productive oil remains
negative (provided that oil and capital are Edgeworth complementary).
Proof. The necessary and suﬃcient conditions the ’Ramsey optimum’ are
Wc = Γ, (14a)
Wx = ΓFl + Σ(1− τk)(1− µ)Fkl, (14b)
−Φ(1− ωτk)ψUcµFe + Γ(Fe − p∗e) + Σ(1− τk)(1− µ)Fke = 0, (14c)
15
−
.
Γ +Γρ = −Φ(1− ωτk)ψUcµFk + Γ(Fk − δ) +Σ(1− τk)(1− µ)Fkk, (14d)
−
.
Γ +Γρ = Γr
∗, (14e)
Σ =
ωψΦUcµF
[(1− µ)Fk − δ]
? 0, (14f)
where Wc ≡ Uc[1+Φ(1+ εc)], andWx ≡ Ux[1+Φ(1+ εx)];19 Γ and Σ denote
multipliers associated with (13b) and (13c), respectively.
The joint use of (4a’), (7c’) and (7d’) implies that, in the steady state,
(1− τk)[(1− µ)Fk − δ] = ρ. By plugging this equation into (14d) yields the
eﬃcient capital income tax rate, which is given by
∼
τ k= −
[µFk(Γ− ψΦUc) + Σ(1− µ)Fkk]
{Γ[(1− µ)Fk − δ] + ωψΦUcµFk − Σ(1− µ)Fkk} . (15a)
With the aid of (14b), the Ramsey condition for oil (14c) can be solved,
after employing (6d), for the optimal oil tax rate as follows
∼
τ e= −
?
µFe[Γ− ΦψUc(1− ω
∼
τ k)] + Σ(1−
∼
τ k)(1− µ)Fke
?
?
Fe[Γ− µΦψUc(1− ω
∼
τ k)] + Σ(1−
∼
τ k)(1− µ)Fke
? . (15b)
The optimal capital and oil tax rates have to be discussed by taking into
account the diﬀerent hypotheses on the tax treatment of profits;20 it is instead
quite straightforward to show that the labor tax rate is always positive. We
have the following cases:
19εc and εx denote general equilibrium elasticities, whose expressions are: εc =
Ucc
Uc
[c − (1 − ωτk)ψµF ] − (1 − x)
Uxc
Uc
and εx =
Ucx
Ux
[c − (1 − ωτk)ψµF ] − (1 − x)
Uxx
Ux
+
(1− ωτk)ψUcµFl
Ux
.
20Also Guo and Lansing (1999) show that when a common tax rate on capital income and
profits is considered in an intertemporal optimizing closed economy model with imperfect
competition, the optimal tax rate on capital income can be either positive or negative.
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i) confiscatory taxation of monopoly profits: ψ = 0
In this case, as ψ = Σ = 0, we have
∼
τ k= −
µFk
[(1− µ)Fk − δ]
< 0, (15a’)
and
∼
τ e= −µ < 0. (15b’)
When monopoly profits are fiscally confiscated, it is optimal to subsidize
capital and, to a lower extent, oil. Capital and oil taxes should be used to
cure the ineﬃciency associated with private market imperfections.
ii) no taxation of monopoly profits: ω = 0 and ψ = 1
When dividends are tax free, Σ = 0 from (14f). Therefore, the optimal tax
rates on capital and oil are respectively given by
∼
τ k= −
µFk(Γ− ΦUc)
Γ[(1− µ)Fk − δ]
, (15a”)
and
∼
τ e= −
µ(Γ− ΦUc)
(Γ− µΦUc)
. (15b”)
Thus, we have that
∼
τ k< 0 and
∼
τ e< 0 as Γ > ΦUc.21 Capital subsidization
should be larger than the oil one.
iii) uniform taxation of pure profits and capital income: ω = ψ = 1
In this circumstance,
∼
τ k is ambiguous as the numerator of (15a) has an
unclear sign. This is because two eﬀects are at work: the underinvestment
eﬀect, due to the distortionary implications of market power, and the pure
profit eﬀect, due to the nondistortionary eﬀect of profit taxation.
∼
τ k oscillates
21This latter inequality holds because
Γ− ΦUc = Uc(1 +Φεc) = Uc
?
Ux(1 + εx)− FlUc[1 + (1−
∼
τ l)εc]
Ux(1 + εx)− FlUc(1 + εc)
?
> 0,
where the expression Φ =
∼
τ l FlUc
[Ux(1 + εx)− FlUc(1 + εc)]
> 0 has been used.
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from the case of capital subsidization, required from a second-best standpoint
to alleviate the distortionary role of market imperfections (as suggested by
Judd, 2002), to the one of profit taxation, that has no distortive role as it
only exerts income eﬀects (this is an aspect emphasized by Guo and Lansing,
1999).
The analytical expressions for the optimal tax rates are
∼
τ k=
?
−µFkΓ+ µFkΦUc[1−
(1− µ)FFkk
[(1− µ)Fk − δ]Fk
]
?
?
Γ[(1− µ)Fk − δ]− µFkΦUc[1−
(1− µ)FFkk
[(1− µ)Fk − δ]Fk
]
? , (15a”’)
∼
τ e= −
?
µFe[Γ− ΦUc(1−
∼
τ k)] +
(1− ∼τ k)µ(1− µ)ΦFUcFke
[(1− µ)Fk − δ]
?
?
Fe[Γ− µΦUc(1−
∼
τ k)] +
(1− ∼τ k)µ(1− µ)ΦFUcFke
[(1− µ)Fk − δ]
? . (15b”’)
While it is not unambiguously clear whether the second-best capital tax
rate is positive or negative or zero, the optimal oil tax rate is clearly negative
since capital and oil are assumed to be Edgeworth complementary (that is,
Fke > 0).?
The analysis conducted here demonstrates that the Diamond andMirrlees
(1971) principle is invalid because of positive profits, as shown by Stiglitz and
Dasgupta (1971).
At the end of the several experiments perfomed with monopolistic com-
petition, a general comment on taxation of oil as a consumer good is in
order. If oil were simultaneously used as a consumer good and productive
input, and oil were taxed at diﬀerent rates according to the diﬀerent uses,
no substantial changes would be obtained for the optimal fiscal policy. The
normative taxation of productive oil would follow the prescriptions obtained
above, while oil used as a consumer good should be positively taxed along
with labor.
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3 A perfectly competitive economy with tax
restrictions
In this Section, we analyze the optimal taxation of oil and capital when there
are restrictions on the capacity of the planner to choose tax rates. In order
to avoid to confuse the implications of government limitations on tax setting
with those of product market imperfections studied above, we consider a
perfectly competitive economy. Two cases of tax restrictions are discussed:
one in which labor cannot be taxed, and one in which the tax rate imposed on
oil used for production is equal to the tax rate on oil used for consumption.
3.1 No taxation of labor
3.1.1 The model
Consider the model developed in Section 2 and assume that there is perfect
competition in the intermediate-good market (i.e., µ = 0). As labor cannot
be taxed, only two tax instruments can be used for financing the exogenous
stream of government spending: productive oil and capital income taxes.22
Under the hypothesis that labor is tax free, the standard Ramsey prob-
lem, obtained by maximizing the utility integral of the representative agent
subject to the implementability and the feasibility constraints, is incomplete.
This is because an additional constraint has to be incorporated into the nor-
mative analysis: the competitive equilibrium of the labor market; that is,
Ux = FlUc. (16)
Without the imposition of such a constraint, the second-best problem
cannot be decentralized as a competitive solution since the resulting Ramsey
plan would not respect equation (16).23
It is not diﬃcult to show that the implementability constraint, indepen-
dently of the international tax system adopted, is now given by
22For simplicity and without any loss of generality, the assumption that oil is solely used
by firms for production is retained.
23See Correia (1996b), and Chari and Kehoe (1999).
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? ∞
0
[cUc − Ux(1− x)]e−ρtdt = Uc0a0. (17)
The Ramsey problem is obtained by maximizing (5) subject to (9), (16)
and (17).
3.1.2 Optimal tax policy
The residence-based system
In this case, the first-order condition of the Ramsey problem for b is still
given by (12e), which is not aﬀected by the imposition of the constraint (16)
and the hypothesis µ = 0. Therefore, from (7c), the result
∼
τ k= 0 is obtained.
This implies that oil taxation remains the only available source for raising
the revenue necessary to finance government spending.
These findings can be summarized as
Proposition 3 In an infinite-lived small open economy with perfect compe-
tition, elastic labor-leisure choices and the worldwide regime of capital taxa-
tion, Ramsey optimality prescribes to tax oil and exempt capital from taxation
when labor cannot be taxed.
The source-based system
When the competitive equilibrium on the labor market — i.e., the condition
(16) — is imposed under the territorial capital tax regime, the first-order
conditions of the second-best problem with respect to k and e are respectively
given by
−
.
Γ +Γρ = Γ(Fk − δ)− ΞUcFlk, (18a)
Γ(Fe − p∗e) = ΞUcFle, (18b)
where Ξ > 0 is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the constraint (16).
By using the input demands (4’) together with the assumption µ = 0,
the following optimal tax rates on capital and oil are obtained
∼
τ k=
ΞUcFlk
Γ(Fk − δ)
, (19a)
20
∼
τ e=
ΞUcFle
(ΓFe − ΞUcFle)
. (19b)
∼
τ k and
∼
τ e are both positive since Flk > 0 and Fle > 0 by Edgeworth comple-
mentarity.
Our discoveries can compactly be expressed as follows
Proposition 4 If a factor of production cannot be taxed, the minimization
of the excess burden of taxation in an oil-dependent small open economy that
operates under the territorial tax system requires to distribute taxation over
the taxable inputs that are Edgeworth complementary with the untaxed factor.
When the tax code is not suﬃciently rich, also highly distortive taxes
become unavoidable from a second-best standpoint in order to raise a given
flow of revenue; such taxes represent de facto an indirect way to tax what
cannot be taxed.
The normative findings obtained here, due to the existence of limitations
to the optimal tax policy, are imputable to the invalidity of the Diamond
and Mirrlees (1971) result, as pointed out, in a static setting, by Munk
(1980) and, in a dynamic setting, by Correia (1996b) and Jones, Manuelli
and Rossi (1993, 1997). The mechanical motivation of our results is based
on the fact that, when additional constraints are imposed on the Ramsey
problem because of the tax restrictions, the cross-partial derivatives of the
production function with respect to labor and capital as well as labor and oil
enter the first-order conditions of the planner problem. This fact undermines
the optimality of the zero taxation of capital and oil in a model with perfect
competition.
3.2 Uniform taxation of productive and consumption
oil
3.2.1 The model
Consider a perfectly competitive economy by postulating µ = 0 in the model
of Section 2. Suppose that there are two uses of oil: one for production, and
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one for consumption. Assume that the tax rates on productive oil and oil
consumed by households are constrained to be the equal.24
If oil used for production is denoted by ef and the oil tax rate paid by
firms by τ fe , the input demand system is given by (4’) when µ = 0 and a
small adjustment in the notation is used; that is,
Fk(k, l, e
f) = R, (20a)
Fl(k, l, e
f) = w, (20b)
Fef (k, l, e
f) = (1 + τ fe )p
∗
e. (20c)
Denote household oil consumption by eh. Now the representative agent
maximizes the integral utility
? ∞
0
U(c, x, eh)e−ρtdt, (21)
subject to, in the case of the residence-based system, the following flow bud-
get constraint
c+(1+τhe )p
∗
ee
h+
.
k +
.
b +
.
d= (1−τk)[(R−δ)k+r∗b]+rd+(1−τ l)wl, (22)
where τhe is the ad valorem tax rate on oil consumption. U( · ) is well-behaved
and c, x and eh are normal goods.
The dynamic utility maximization yields, as first-order conditions, equa-
tions (7) and
Ueh = Uc(1 + τ
h
e )p
∗
e. (23)
Under the territorial tax regime, the instantaneous budget constraint is
24The case of distinct oil tax rates will not be considered here, since it is not diﬃcult
to ascertain that in such a circumstance — independently of the international tax regime
implemented — the optimal tax on capital and productive oil would be zero, while the tax
rate on oil used as a consumer good and the labor tax rate would instead be positive.
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c+(1+ τhe )p
∗
ee
h+
.
k +
.
b +
.
d= (1− τk)(R− δ)k+ r∗b+ rd+(1− τ l)wl. (22’)
In this case, the first-order conditions of the consumer problem are given
by (7a), (7b), (7c’), (7d’) and (23).
In the government budget constraints (8) and (8’), Π = ψ = ω = 0 and
the item τ fep
∗
ee
f + τhep
∗
ee
h replaces τ ep∗ee on the revenue side.
Finally, the current account dynamics are described by
.
b= F (k, l, e
f) + r∗b− c−
.
k −δk − g − p∗e(ef + eh). (24)
3.2.2 Optimal fiscal policy
The residence-based system
The Ramsey problem is
max
? ∞
0
W (c, x, eh,Φ)e−ρtdt (25a)
subject to (24) and
Ueh = UcFef , (25b)
where
W (c, x, eh,Φ) = U(c, x, eh) + Φ[cUc + e
hUeh − Ux(1− x)].
The constraint (25b) guarantees that the tax rate on oil used for pro-
duction and the tax rate on oil employed for consumption are equal, i.e.
τhe = τ
f
e = τ e.
The first-order conditions for the Ramsey optimum with respect to ef
and b are
Γ(Fef − p∗e)− ΛUcFef ef = 0, (26a)
−
.
Γ +Γρ = Γr
∗, (26b)
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where Λ is the Lagrange multiplier on the constraint (25b).
Therefore, using (7c), (7d) and (26), we get
∼
τ k= 0, (27a)
and
∼
τ e=
ΛUcFefef
(ΓFef − ΛUcFef ef )
> 0. (27b)
since Λ < 0.25
∼
τ k is zero because of perfect capital mobility.
∼
τ e is, instead, positive as
we are constraining two taxes with diﬀerent eﬃciency costs to be equal.
The following proposition synthesized our findings:
Proposition 5 A uniform taxation of oil used as an input and a consumer
good in a perfectly competitive model under a worldwide regime implies a zero
capital income tax as well as positive oil and labor taxes.
The source-based system
When the international tax regime is of the territorial type, the optimal
conditions of the Ramsey plan for ef , b and k, are given by (26) and
−
.
Γ +Γρ = Γ(Fk − δ)− ΛUcFefk. (28)
25Λ is obtained as follows. The optimal Ramsey conditions for c and x are
Wc = Γ− Λ(Uehc − FefUcc), (i)
Wx = ΓFl − Λ(Uehx − FefUcx − UcFef l), (ii)
where Wc = Uc[1+Φ(1+ ηc)], Wx = Ux[1+Φ(1+ ηx)], ηc =
cUcc
Uc
+ eh
Uehc
Uc
− (1− x)Uxc
Uc
and ηx =
cUcx
Ux
+ eh
Uehx
Ux
− (1− x)Uxx
Ux
.
By using (i) and (ii) to eliminate Γ, we get
Λ = {Φ(ηx − ηc)−
∼
τ l [1 +Φ(1 + ηx)]}
[Fl(Uehc − FefUcc) + FefUcx + UcFef l − Uehx]
< 0.
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From (28), (7c’) and (7d’), in the long-run, we get
∼
τ k=
ΛUcFefk
Γ(Fk − δ)
< 0, (29)
and (27b).
As Λ < 0,26
∼
τ k< 0 and
∼
τ e> 0 from (29) and (27b). The high eﬃciency
costs connected with the taxation of ef are compensated by a subsidy im-
posed on k.
Therefore, the following statement summarizes our discoveries
Proposition 6 In a perfectly competitive small open economy, oil and labor
have to be taxed under the territorial tax system, when oil used by firms and
household oil consumption are taxed equally. The second-best tax rate on
capital income should, instead, be negative.
4 Concluding remarks
This paper has analyzed the eﬃcient taxation of oil and capital income in
an infinitely lived small open economy facing perfect capital mobility when
there are either product market imperfections or restrictions on the feasible
set of tax policies. These elements, previously unexplored in terms of second-
best factor taxation within oil using economies, undermine the Diamond and
Mirrlees (1971) principle, which support the optimality of exempting oil used
by firms and capital income from taxation.
In order to better understand and therefore corroborate the didascalic
message of the paper, the implications of market imperfections and tax re-
strictions have been investigated separately. In particular, we have studied
an economy with imperfect competition and no tax limitations, on the one
side, and an economy with perfect competition and tax restrictions, on the
other.
Our findings stem from the invalidity of the prohibition against the in-
termediate goods taxation, pointed out in static models by Stiglitz and Das-
gupta (1971) — when markets are monopolistically competitive — and Munk
26See footnote 26.
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(1980) — when there are restrictions to the optimal choice of taxes. Prod-
uct market power and limitations in the ability of the planner to optimally
choose taxes can be viewed as forms of imperfections. We have discussed
circumstances in which, by taking into account eﬃciency considerations, oil
and capital taxes have to correct these imperfections. We have discovered
that the optimal tax structure depends, among other factors, on the interna-
tional tax system chosen (residence-based versus source-based) and, in the
imperfectly competitive case, on the fiscal treatment of monopoly profits.
The synopsis of the results of the paper is as follows:
(1) Monopolistic competition with no tax restrictions
When a residence-based system is implemented, second-best optimality
prescribes to remove the distortion of capital income taxation. Productive oil
taxation should be zero when monopoly profits are tax free, while it should
be negative if instead profits are fiscally confiscated. Labor bears the burden
of taxation.
Under a source-based system, the degree of profit taxation determines the
structure of the optimal tax policy. The optimal taxes on oil used by firms
and capital are negative when monopoly profits are either untaxed or taxed
confiscatorily. When profits are taxed at the same rate as capital income,
the optimal tax rate on productive oil remains negative, while the eﬃcient
capital tax rate may be positive or negative.
(2) Perfect competition with tax restrictions
2.a) In a perfectly competitive economy operating under the worldwide regime,
Ramsey optimality calls for a tax on productive oil and no capital taxation
if labor is tax free. The minimization of the excess burden of taxation within
an economy that operates under the territorial system requires, instead, to
distribute the tax burden over capital and oil used by firms.
2.b) A uniform taxation of oil used by firms and households implies, under
the worldwide regime, a Ramsey plan characterized by a zero capital income
tax as well as positive oil and labor taxes. Under the territorial tax system,
oil and labor should be taxed, while the optimal tax rate on capital should
instead be negative.
To conclude, we can notice, from a methodological point of view, that
the optimality of zero taxation of oil as an input is denied when: i) oil enters
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the implementability constraint and therefore the pseudo-welfare function
of the planner; ii) there are additional constraints, faced by the planner
that private agents do not face, involving the production function. These
conditions, which are parallel to those emphasized by Jones, Manuelli and
Rossi (1997, pp. 105-6) for the zero capital tax result,27 further demonstrate
the analogies between a tax on productive oil and a tax on capital income.
27One exception to this parallelism is obtained here under the residence-based system
when markets are imperfectly competitive and monopoly profits are fiscally confiscated.
27
References
Atkeson, A., Chari, V.V. and P.J. Kehoe, (1999), “Taxing Capital Income:
A Bad Idea”, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review, 23, 3-
17.
Atkinson, A.B. and J.E. Stiglitz, (1972), ”The Structure of Indirect Tax-
ation and Economic Eﬃciency”, Journal of Public Economics, 1, 97-119.
Benhabib, J. and R.E.A. Farmer, (1994), ”Indeterminacy and Increasing
Returns”, Journal of Economic Theory, 63, 19-41.
Bovenberg, A.L. and L.H. Goulder, (2002), ”Environmental Taxation and
Regulation”, in Auerbach A.J. and M. Feldstein (eds), Handbook of public
economics, Elsevier Science, Amsterdam, Volume 3, 1471-1545.
Chamley, C. (1986), “Optimal Taxation of Capital Income in General
Equilibrium with Infinite Lives”, Econometrica, 54, 607-22.
Chari, V.V., and P.J. Kehoe, (1999), ”Optimal Fiscal and Monetary Pol-
icy”, in Taylor, J.B. and M. Woodford (eds), Handbook of Macroeconomics,
Elsevier Science, Amsterdam, Volume 1C, 1671-1745.
Correia, I. H. (1996a), “Dynamic Optimal Taxation in Small Open Economies”,
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 20, 691-708.
Correia, I.H. (1996b), ”Should Capital Income Be Taxed in the Steady
State?”, Journal of Public Economics, 60, 147-51.
De Miguel, C. and B. Manzano, (2006), ”Optimal Oil Taxation in a Small
Open Economy”, Review of Economic Dynamics, 9, 438-54.
Diamond, P.A. and D.L. McFadden, (1974), ”Some Uses of the Expendi-
ture Function in Public Finance”, Journal of Public Economics, 3, 3-21.
Diamond, P.A. and J.A. Mirrlees, (1971), ”Optimal Taxation and Public
Production: I—Production Eﬃciency”, and ”Optimal Taxation and Public
Production II: Tax Rules”, American Economic Review, 61, 8-27 and 261-
78.
Goulder, L. H., (1994), ”Energy Taxes: Traditional Eﬃciency Eﬀects
and Environmental Implications”, in Poterba J. (ed.), Tax policy and the
economy, Volume 8, Cambridge: MIT Press, 105-58.
28
Guo, J.T. and K.J. Lansing, (1999), ”Optimal Taxation of Capital In-
come with Imperfectly Competitive Product Markets”, Journal of Economic
Dynamics and Control, 23, 967-95.
Jones, L.E., Manuelli R.E., and P.E. Rossi, (1993), “On the Optimal
Taxation of Capital Income”, NBER working paper no. 4525.
Jones, L.E., Manuelli R.E., and P.E. Rossi, (1997), “On the Optimal
Taxation of Capital Income”, Journal of Economic Theory, 73, 93-117.
Judd, K.L. (1999), “Optimal Taxation and Spending in General Equilib-
rium Competitive Growth Models”, Journal of Public Economics, 71, 1-26.
Judd, K.L. (2002), ”Capital-Income Taxation with Imperfect Competi-
tion”, American Economic Review, 92, 417-21.
Lucas, R.E. (1990), “Supply-Side Economics: An Analytical Review”,
Oxford Economic Papers, 42, 293-316.
Lucas, R.E., and N.L. Stokey, (1983), “Optimal Fiscal and Monetary
Policy in an Economy without Capital”, Journal of Monetary Economics,
12, 55-93.
Munk, K.J. (1980), ”Optimal Taxation with Some Non-Taxable Com-
modities”, Review of Economic Studies, 47, 755-65.
Newbery, D.M. (2005), ”Why Tax Energy? Towards a More Rational
Policy”, Energy Journal, 26, 1-39.
Ramsey, F.P. (1927), ”A Contribution to the Theory of Taxation”, Eco-
nomic Journal, 37, 47-61.
Rotemberg, J.J. and M. Woodford, (1994), ”Energy Taxes and Aggregate
Economic Activity”, in Poterba J. (Eds), Tax policy and the economy, Volume
8, Cambridge: MIT Press, 159-95.
Rotemberg, J.J. and M. Woodford, (1996), ”Imperfect Competition and
the Eﬀects of Energy Price Increases on Economic Activity”, Journal of
Money, Credit, and Banking, 28, 550-77.
Stiglitz, J.E. and P. Dasgupta, (1971), ”Diﬀerential Taxation, Public
Goods and Economic Eﬃciency”, Review of Economic Studies, 38, 151-74.
Svensson, L.E.O., (1984), ”Oil Prices, Welfare, and the Trade Balance”,
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 99, 649-72.
29
